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MUST THE HOUSE CONSENT TO CESSION
OF THE PANAMA CANAL?
Raoul Bergert
INTRODUCTION
It is truly remarkable that for 189 years the courts had not
squarely faced an important constitutional accommodation be-
tween the treaty power and the article IV provision "Congress
shall have Power to dispose of ... Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." ' Now the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, splitting two to one with Judge
George MacKinnon vigorously dissenting, has concluded in Ed-
wards v. Carter,2 that disposition of the Panama Canal by treaty did
not require assent by the House of Representatives, a joint branch
of "Congress."
t Member, Illinois and District of Columbia bars. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati;
J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati; LL.D 1978 University of Michigan.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
2 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). An earlier decision by the
same court, Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73 (1903), with implications to the contrary,
is discussed in note 116 and accompanying text infra.
The Edwards majority stated:
The District Court did not reach the merits of this controversy; rather, it dis-
missed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that appellants
[sixty members of the House of Representatives] lacked standing because they
had failed to demonstrate injury in fact from the President's invocation of the
treaty process.
580 F.2d at 1056. See Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1055
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). The majority skipped over the jurisdictional
issue because remand would have been the likely result; they reached the merits largely
because "this controversy present[s] a pure question of law, with no need of a hearing for
fact development, because these merits are so clearly against the parties asserting jurisdic-
tion." 580 F.2d at "1056-57.
Justice Frankfurter rooted the standing doctrine in constitutional compulsions. See
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-59 (1951) (concurring
opinion); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-70 (1939) (dissenting opinion). Although I
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The issue, clouded by political passions during the Senate de-
bates on ratification, is indeed momentous. A "national treasure
beyond compare," to borrow from Judge MacKinnon, 3 is being
given to Panama over the opposition of the majority of the
people.4 Because Edwards sets a precedent that tremendously
diminishes the role of the House in preserving the national do-
main, and, by its reasoning, also invites the President to displace
congressional article I, section 8 powers heretofore deemed exclu-
sive, it demands the closest scrutiny. The majority draws comfort
from the testimony of an array of administration and former
State Department officials,5 but matters of such fundamental,
far-reaching importance must be settled by resort to first princi-
ples, not by a count of noses.6  Judicial authority, Chief Justice
Taney declared, should "depend altogether on the force of the
differ with that view (see Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Re-
quirement, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969)), the Court, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), de-
rived its emphasis on "a personal stake in the outcome" (id. at 101) from the "Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction" (id.). Apparently that remains the law; the federal
courts "have consistently held that Article III of the Constitution prevents judicial determi-
nation of any case in which the plaintiff has no interest at stake." K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 524 (1976). See Simon v'. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 37-46 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-75 (1974). If "stand-
ing" goes to the jurisdiction (see United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192,
197 (1956)), quaere whether it may be waived for a "pure question of law."
I Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d at 1100 (dissenting opinion).
4 Hedrick Smith referred to "the lopsided antitreaty sentiment in public opinion polls
last fall." N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1978, at 1, col. 1. See id., Apr. 14, 1978, at 10, col. 6.
Recently, Smith reported that five liberal Democratic Senators who "had supported the
administration on the Panama Canal Treaties" were defeated. Id., Nov. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
' See 580 F.2d at 1057 n.4. The majority also relies on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Report (see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 95-12, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS REPORT]), which swallowed the party line hook, line, and sinker. As Judge
MacKinnon observed, "[i]t is not surprising that those promoting the present treaty also
decide that they have power to accomplish the result they seek. It is ever thus with usurped
authority." 580 F.2d at 1069 n.10 (dissenting opinion). See the remark of Lord Chief Jus-
tice Denman quoted in text accompanying note 184 infra.
6 A great British scholar, W.S. McKechnie, faced by contrary opinions of respected
scholars, declared: "[Tlhe truth of historical questions does not depend on the counting of
votes or the weight of authority" but on the historical record. W.S. McKECHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA 135 (1905).
In Thorlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), Justice
Daniel stated: "[n matters involving the meaning and integrity of the constitution, I never
can consent that the text of that instrument shall be overlaid and smothered by the glosses
of essay-writers, lecturers, and commentators. Nor will I abide the decisions of judges,
believed by me to be invasions of the great lex legum." Id. at 612 (separate opinion). For
citations to similar expressions by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas, and Justice
Frankfurter, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 297 n.57 (1977).
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reasoning by which it is supported."7 So tested, the certitude of
the majority opinion is in inverse proportion to its reasoning.
My thesis is not, as the Edwards majority imputed to me, "that
the President and Senate cannot exercise under the treaty power
any power granted to Congress," 8 but rather that a treaty dispos-
ing of United States territory or property is subject to the assent
of Congress, including the House. 9 In other words, the President
and Senate are authorized to enter into such treaties, but the
treaties should be made subject to the consent of Congress, as has
often been the case. This, as will appear, was the view of Madison
and the House from the beginning. Preliminarily, it needs to be
noted that the issue of "sovereignty" over the Canal Zone may be
put aside because article IV applies to "property" of the United
States as well as "territory." The right "in perpetuity [of] the use,
occupation and control" of the Canal Zone, conferred by the
Treaty of 1903,10 is itself "property" akin to a 99-year lease. It was
not disputed that the recent Panama Treaty would convey "prop-
erty belonging to the United States,"II and, with Judge MacKin-
non,' 2 I consider that it is beyond serious argument.
7 Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (dissenting
opinion).
8 580 F.2d at 1057 n.4.
9 Dean Louis Pollak, who is among the "authorities" cited by the majority to buttress
its views (see id.), had written: "The thrust of Mr. Berger's statement was that the cession to
the Republic of Panama ... cannot constitutionally be effectuated by treaty, but only by
statute .... (124 CONG. REC. S729 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978)). In my reply, I "disclaim[ed]
the version of the issue that had been attributed to me, namely that the Panama cession
'cannot be effectuated by treaty, but only by statute.' My objection is to a 'self-executing'
treaty because article IV of the Constitution requires Congress' consent to the disposition."
Id. at S1414 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978).
10 Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, art. II, 33 Stat.
2234, T.S. No. 431.
" See 580 F.2d at 1057 n.3; id at 1080 (dissenting opinion). Professor John Norton
Moore, formerly Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Chairman of
the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, and United
States Ambassador to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, stated
that the "core" of the "dispute" between the United States and Panama "has been the
question of residual or 'titular' sovereignty over the Zone left in doubt by the language of
Article III of the 1903 treaty." Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 90 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings]. See Moore, Perspective, 30 Va. L. Weekly, Feb. 17, 1978, at
2, Col. 3.
12 See 580 F.2d at 1080 n.17(dissenting opinion). Judge MacKinnon notes that the
transfer of real property
includes the entire Panama Railroad, which the United States purchased as au-
thorized by Congress ... and all the other real property that the United States
purchased from the individual owners of the land, including the property and
other interests of the French Canal Company for which the U.S. paid $40
million.
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The Edwards majority begins its interpretive analysis with the
statement that article IV recites "that 'The Congress shall have
Power .... ,' not that only the Congress shall have power." 13 The
"only" is implicit under established rules of construction. The
Supreme Court has often held that "[w]hen a statute limits a thing
to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode." 14 And it has held that "[g]eneral language of a
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not
be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part
of the same enactment." 15 The specific power to "dispose" pre-
vails over the general treatymaking power. The majority's omis-
sion to notice such traditional canons of construction smacks of
disdain, whereas the Supreme Court had concluded that article
IV "implies an exclusion of all other authority over the property
which could interfere with this right." 16
Id. An itemized breakdown of the United States property interests and their costs is set
forth in STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE PANAMA CANAL OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON MER-
CHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 95TH CONG., 2d. SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ROLE OF THE CONGRESS IN THE DISPOSAL OF U.S. PROPERTY IN THE CANAL ZONE 4-5 (Comm.
Print 1978). The purchased lands total 647 square miles. Id. at 4.
13 580 F.2d at 1057. Judge MacKinnon points out that article IV evidences an intent
to restrict the power to dispose of territory or property and this was the only
place such intent is addressed. Had the convention intended to authorize the
disposition of property as an incident of the treaty power, it would have been
very easy to do so by merely inserting before the semi-colon in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2:
"(which may also be disposed of by treaty)."
Id. at 1078 (dissenting opinion).
14 Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See T.I.M.E. Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959).
15 D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). See City of Tulsa v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75 F.2d 343, 351 (10th Cir. 1935). The point was made during
the debate on the Jay Treaty in 1796 by Brent:
[T]he Treaty-making power is delegated as a general power, while to Congress
specific powers are granted. The rational and admitted rule of construction in
these cases is, that specific power restrains general powers; and here, then, the
general Treaty power must be restrained by the specific powers of Congress.
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (1796).
Judge MacKinnon calls attention to the recent opinion of his court in Lodge 1858,
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which stated: "The
established rule is that if there exists a conflict in the provisions of the same act, the last
provision in point of arrangement must control." Id. at 510, quoted in Edwards v. Carter,
580 F.2d 1055, 1079 n.16 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
And the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that "a construction which
leaves to each element of the statute a function in some way different from the others" is
preferable to one which causes one section to overlap with another. United States v. Di-
nerstein, 362 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1966). Such rules were not designed to be applied
at judicial whim.
16 Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890) (emphasis added).
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In the absence of evidence of the Framers' intent, a matter to
which I shall recur, such rules are the established index of con-
struction, and are constantly applied by the courts. They were
among the presuppositions of the Founders, 17 reflecting a pro-
found distrust of judicial discretion.' Hamilton averred: "To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them."19 In the First Congress, which con-
tained numerous Framers and Ratifiers, Representatives Egbert
Benson and Alexander White invoked the "expressio unius" rule.2 0
Other relevant canons of construction were cited in the 1796 de-
bate on the Jay Treaty.2 ' Justice Story emphasized that such
rules provide a "fixed standard" for interpretation, 22 without
which the "fixed Constitution," so dear to the Founders,23 would
17 Judge Edmund Pendleton of the Virginia Court of Appeals and presiding officer of
the Virginia Ratification Convention, had "recourse to the old English canons of statutory
construction .... The resort to the accepted rules of statutory interpretation to settle the
intent and meaning of constitutional provisions was ... a method used by courts elsewhere
in the Confederation." J. GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 128 (P. Freund ed. 1971).
18 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 306-08. In the 1796 debate on the Jay Treaty,
Chauncey Goodrich observed "how attentively Judges, in construing written instruments
and statutes, regarded the expressions, and how little latitude they allowed to their inven-
tive faculties, or their own fancies about policy or expediency." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 719
(1796). The judiciary, it was said in Trustees of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58,
88 (1805), "have no discretionary powers enabling them to judge of the propriety or im-
propriety of laws."
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Mod Lib. ed. 1937).
20 Benson observed: "[lit cannot be rationally intended that all offices should be held
during good behaviour, because the Constitution has declared one office [the judicial] to be
held by this tenure." I ANNALS OF CONG. 505 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print bearing
running title "History of Congress"). For White, see id. at 517.
2'Albert Gallatin stated: "The different clauses of the Constitution must be so construed
as to be rendered consistent, and to be reconciled one with the other; and that construction
must be rejected which would destroy any of them." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1796). For
similar expressions by Page, see id. at 561. The influential Federal Farmer was later quoted
to the same effect. Id. at 581 (remarks of Rep. Brent). For a similar expression by Jefferson
in 1791, see 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 363 (1911).
22 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 399, at
383 (Boston 1833).
13 Samuel Adams, writing under the pseudonym "Candidus," stated: "Vatel tells us
plainly and without hesitation, that 'the supreme legislative cannot change the constitution,'
... 'that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred .... ' And he gives a reason
for it solid and weighty; for, says he, 'the constitution of the state ought to be fixed."
Letter from Candidus (S. Adams) to Boston Gazette (Jan. 25, 1772) (emphasis in original),
reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 322, 325 (H. Cushing ed. 1906). "iT]he constitu-
tion is fixed ... [the legislative] cannot change the constitution without destroying its own
foundation." Letter from the Massachusetts House to the Earl of Shelburne (Jan. 15,
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be forever unfixed. A further guide to construction is furnished
by Pierson v. Ray. 24 There the Court declared with respect to the
common-law immunity of judges from suits arising from acts per-
formed in their official capacity: "We do not believe that this set-
tled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable
'every person' who under color of law deprives another person of
his civil rights.... [W]e presume that Congress would have specif-
ically so provided had it wished tQ abolish the doctrine. 25 Thus
the all-inclusive phrase "every person" was held inapplicable to a
judge's common-law immunity in the absence of a specific provi-
sion. That unwritten immunity stands no higher than the express
"Congress shall have power" in the absence of specific provision
in the treaty power for depriving Congress of the disposal power.
I
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
"The debates over the treaty clause ... " in the several con-
ventions, Edwards v. Carter holds, "directly demonstrate the Fram-
ers' intent to permit the disposition of United States property by
treaty without House approval." 2 6 That was not the view of one
of the leading advocates of the Panama Treaty, who was cited by
the majority. 7 Professor John Norton Moore, formerly a high
State Department official, stated in the Senate hearings that pro-
ponents of an "exclusive" reading of article IV have shown "the
lack of definitive evidence as to the framers' intent." 28  In fact,
the evidence cuts against the majority's view.
All that was under discussion in the Federal Convention
treaty-clause debates was performance of the Senate's "advice and
1768), reprinted in 1 H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 65, 65 (8th ed.
1968).
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of gov-
ernment and its limits, that government is the creature of the constitution and
cannot do what it does not authorize and must not do what it forbids. A priori,
such a constitution could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if it were
to fulfill its function. For changed conditions, the instrument itself made provi-
sion for amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written con-
stitution, was expected to be the only form of change ....
P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978).
24 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
25 Id. at 554-55.
26 580 F.2d at 1059-60. At another point, the majority states that history "clearly dem-
onstrates the Framers' intention to allow disposition of the United States property through
self-executing treaty." Id. at 1058 n.7.
27 Id. at 1057 n.4.
28 Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 4, at 94.
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consent" function, without a hint of desire to curtail the powers of
the House under article IV. The proceedings in the Convention
have been well summarized by Judge MacKinnon.2 9 When the
provision under discussion on September 7 was that "no Treaty
shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the Members
present," 3 0 the words "(except Treaties of Peace)" were added on
Madison's motion. 3 1 The exception would have enabled a major-
ity of those present to ratify a peace treaty. Thereupon, a motion
was made to add, "But no Treaty of peace shall be entered into,
whereby the United States shall be deprived of any of their pres-
ent territory or rights without the concurrence of two thirds of
the members of the Senate present."32 As Judge MacKinnon
points out, this amendment came to naught by virtue of adjourn-
ment, and was not offered again.3 3 Elbridge Gerry urged
that in treaties of peace a greater rather than less proportion of
votes was necessary, than in other treaties. In Treaties of peace
the dearest interests will be at stake, as the fisheries, territories
&c. In treaties of peace also there is more danger to the ex-
tremities of the Continent, of being sacrificed, than on any
other occasions.
34
Manifestly, the "extremities" refer to areas subject to "boundary
disputes" which, as will appear, are sui generis, and do not really
involve cessions of territory belonging to the United States.
35
Notwithstanding, Madison's "exception" was again approved by a
vote of eight to three. 3 1 Williamson and Spaight then "moved
'that no Treaty of Peace affecting Territorial rights shd be
made without the concurrence of two thirds of the (members of
the Senate present),'" 37 seeking thereby to exclude treaties of
peace "affecting territorial rights" from Madison's majority-vote
"exception." A note added to Madison's records recites: "The sub-
ject was then debated, but the motion does not appear to have
been made." 38 On the following day, Roger Sherman spoke
against "leaving the rights, established by the Treaty of Peace, to
the Senate, & moved to annex a 'proviso that no such rights
29 See 580 F.2d at 1089-90 (dissenting opinion).
30 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 495.
31 Id. at 533, 540.
32 Id. at 534.
:1 580 F.2d at 1089 (dissenting opinion).
34 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 541.
35 See notes 188-97 and accompanying text infra.
36 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 541.
37 Id. at 543.
38 4 id. at 58 (rev. ed. 1937).
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shd be ceded without the sanction of the Legislature,' ":39 _
again a reference to boundary disputes. Neither Williamson,
Spaight, nor Sherman took notice of the article IV "Congress shall
... dispose," and it is a strained construction that would read
their abortive motions and remarks as evidence of a legislative
intent to block House participation in a cession. Then too, the
Convention's overnight reversal of its approval of Madison's "ex-
ception" 40 testifies to the fluidity of its views and argues against
giving the foregoing remarks undue significance.
The narrow compass of such remarks is illustrated by one of
Attorney General Bell's references in the Senate hearings-a let-
ter from the aforesaid Hugh Williamson, written to Madison some
nine months after the close of the Convention, to recall "a Proviso
in the new Sistem which was inserted for the express purpose of
preventing a majority of the Senate ... from giving up the Missis-
sippi. It is provided that two thirds of the Members present in the
senate shall be required to concur in making Treaties." 41 William-
son feared that General Wilkinson might be led to give up "the
Navigation of the Mississippi," 42 and observed that "the Naviga-
tion of the Mississippi ... was not to be risqued in the Hands of a
meer Majority."41 This letter indicates that Williamson and
Spaight were concerned with claims to rights of navigation rather
than a cession of territory. 44  Nor was that issue the sole motiva-
tion for insistence on a two-thirds requirement. George Mason
explained in the Virginia Ratification Convention that, because of
their concern about the Newfoundland fisheries, "[t]he eastern
states ... agreed at length, that treaties should require the con-
sent of two-thirds of the members present in the senate." 45 Such
diverse motives counsel against reading the several "two-thirds"
remarks as evidence of an intention to diminish the role of the
House under article IV. It needs also to be borne in mind that
39 2 id. at 548.
40 Id. at 548-49.
4 3 id. at 306-07 (emphasis added), quoted in Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra
note 11, pt. 1, at 210 (statement of Att'y Gen. Bell).
42 Id. at 306.
43 Id. at 307.
44 The Supreme Court has explained that the Louisiana Purchase (later in time) "arose
primarily from the fixed policy of Spain to exclude all foreign commerce from the Missis-
sippi. This restriction became intolerable to the large number of immigrants who were
leaving the Eastern States to settle in the fertile valley." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
251-52 (1901).
'5 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 335. Gerry, too, had adverted to protection of the
fisheries. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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references to territorial cessions in the Federal Convention were
in the context of treaties of peace, 46 which, as Hamilton later
stated, were commonly concerned with "restitutions or cessions of
territory," 47 possibly under force majeure. It may well be asked
whether any thought was given to cessions under any other cir-
cumstances.
From the final, independent clause of article IV, section 3,
clause 2-"nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State"-the Edwards majority deduces that "the property clause
was intended to delineate the role to be played by the central gov-
ernment in the disposition of Western lands ... to preserve both
federal claims and conflicting state claims to certain portions of
the Western lands."48 That clause has no reference to unilateral
disposition by Congress but rather to judicial settlement of those
claims. 49  Hamilton wrote that article IV extends to property of
the United States "where the title is not disputed by a foreign
power," 50 obviously a formulation more comprehensive than the
majority's. The all-inclusive language of article IV is not to be lim-
ited to Western lands in the absence of a clear intent to do so. In
any event, the Supreme Court has not acted on the majority's
narrow view but, for example, has invoked article IV to sustain
Congress' cession of submerged coastal lands to Texas, 51 and to
decide that the President may not dispose of the federal domain
without congressional authorization.
52
The Edwards majority seeks confirmation in remarks by Wil-
liam Grayson in the Virginia Ratification Convention, rejecting
Governor Randolph's assurance that article IV protected against
"dismemberment" of the United States.53  Article IV, Grayson in-
sisted,
48 See text accompanying notes 34, 37 & 39 supra.
47 Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Camillus) (New York Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 13, 18 (H. Syrett ed. 1974). Letters of Camillus were
written in defense of the Jay Treaty.
48 580 F.2d at 1059.
49 When Luther Martin moved to amend the clause by adding, "But all such claims
may be examined into & decided upon by the supreme Court of the U- States" (2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 20, at 466), Gouverneur Morris replied: "[T]his is unnecessary, as all
suits to which the U.S.- are parties-are already to be decided by the Supreme Court"
(id.).
50 Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Camillus) (New York Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 13, 21.
51 See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
52 Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496 (1890).
53 580 F.2d at 1059 n.9.
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related solely to the back lands claimed by the United States,
and different states. This clause was inserted for the purpose of
enabling congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory, or other property, belong-
ing to the United States, and to ascertain clearly that the claims
of particular states respecting territory, should not be prej-
udiced by the alteration of government; but be on the same
footing as before. That it could not be construed to be a limita-
tion of the power of making treaties. Its sole intention was to
obviate all the doubts and disputes which existed under the
confederation concerning the western territory, and other
places in controversy in the United States.
5 4
On Grayson's view, Congress has no power to dispose of property
which does not concern "the western territory and other places in
controversy in the United States"-such as surplus military
materiel in the far Pacific after World War II-thus elevating the
treaty power, which the administration at most claims is a "con-
current power," to a post of exclusive preeminence! The majority
overlooked that Grayson was an opponent who sought throughout
to block adoption of the Constitution by a parade of horribles-
such as an unlimited treaty power-and that, from Jefferson on-
wards, such utterances have been given no weight in ascertaining
the legislative intention. 55
Grayson insisted that "lilt ought to be expressly provided,
that no dismemberment should take place without the consent of
the legislature," that is "three-fourths of the members of both
houses of congress."5 6  But Madison, the chief architect of the
Constitution and leader in the fight for its adoption in the Vir-
ginia Convention, had earlier stated that "[t]he power of making
treaties does not involve a right of dismembering the union," 5 7
and he later added, "I do not think the whole legislative authority
51 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 462 (2d ed. Washington, D.C. 1836), quoted in part in Edwards v.
Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1059 n.9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
5' Jefferson looked for the "meaning" of the Constitution to the "explanations of those
who advocated, not those who opposed it." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 460 (remarks of
Mr. Rutledge). For similar remarks of Gallatin, see id. at 446. In the Jay Treaty debate,
Edward Livingston said: "[T]he framers and friends to the Constitution construed it in the
manner that we do; whilst its enemies endeavored to render it odious and unpopular, by
endeavoring to fix on it the contrary construction." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 635 (1796). As said
by the Supreme Court, "[an unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of
the majority." Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). See Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 485 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976); NLRB v. Thompson Prods., Inc., 141 F.2d
794, 798 (9th Cir. 1944).
56 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 554.
.7 Id. at 458.
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have this power."58 Were the Canal Zone a territory of the
United States instead of an area occupied under a grant of use
and occupancy in perpetuity-which some might view as a techni-
cal distinction 59-Madison's statement indicates that an amend-
ment would be required to cede the Canal Zone to Panama. For
present purposes, it suffices that Francis Corbin, an advocate of
the Constitution responding to Grayson's charge that Congress
could "give the Mississippi also by treaty" 60 (at that time there was
no more than a shadowy claim to navigational rights), said that
for a surrender of the Mississippi "the consent of the House of
Representatives would be requisite."6" He did not tie this to arti-
cle IV, but Governor Randolph had done so, adding that "[w]hen
the constitution marks out the powers to be exercised by particu-
lar departments, I say no innovation can take place." 62
The Edwards majority correctly states "[t]hat the two-thirds
voting requirement did not affect the scope of the treaty power,
but only made ratification of treaties more difficult," 63 as might
with equal justice be said of its effect on article IV. But the major-
ity cites, as evidence of "the broad interpretation given Article II,
§ 2 at the time of its inception,"6 4 an amendment proposed by the
Virginia Convention:
[N]o treaty, ceding ... the territorial rights or claims of the
United States ... shall be made, but in cases of the most urgent
and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified with-
out the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of
the members of both houses respectively.
65
58 Id. at 470. In the Jay Treaty debates, Gallatin stated:
[I]t was agreed by all the writers on the subject, (and he quoted Vattel, book i,
ch. 21,) that even where the Legislative and Treaty-making powers were united
in the same hands, it did not follow that the conductor of the nation had a
power to dismember or alienate the territory of the nation, unless he had re-
ceived from them not only the power of making Treaties, not only general
Legislative powers, but also either the express power of alienating, or... an...
unlimited, and despotic authority over the nation.
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 727 (1796).
59 With reference to the Canal Zone, the Court declared: "It is hypercritical to contend
that the title of the United States is imperfect, and that the territory described does not
belong to this Nation, because of the omission of some of the technical terms used in
ordinary conveyances of real estate." Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 33 (1907).
60 3 J. ELUOT, supra note 54, at 462.
6, Id. at 467.
62 Id. at 461.
63 580 F.2d at 1060.
64 Id.
65 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 594-95 (emphasis added), quoted in Edwards v. Carter,
580 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). Several states proposed
amendments to the Constitution. "In no state was there any considerable discussion of
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This drastically upped the requisite two-thirds of Senate members
present to three-fourths of the members of both Houses, and to
my mind it represents a renewal of the struggle for House par-
ticipation in the ratification of such treaties. To go beyond this to
infer that the House could, by use of treaties, be excluded from
an article IV disposition of property is to overlook that the Vir-
ginia Convention likewise recommended that "the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of government should be separate
and distinct," 6 and that the right to challenge jurors should not
be restrainedY.6  The Virginia Convention had been assured by
John Marshall, Edmund Pendleton and Governor Randolph that
the words "trial by jury" embraced all its attributes, such as the
right to challenge jurors.68 Obviously, these abortive recommen-
dations do not prove that separation of powers therefore is not a
fundamental principle of the Constitution, or that the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee the right to challenge jurors. Rather, they
should be regarded, as Luther Martin explairred his rejected insis-
tence on a specific provision for judicial arbitrament of conflicting
federal-state territorial claims, 69 as attempts "to remove all doubts
on [these points]." 70 When implicit rights are not thus negatived,
how much stronger is the case for giving effect to the express arti-
cle IV grant to Congress despite such proposals.
It needs also to be borne in mind that the House was
excluded from treatymaking because, as Roger Sherman stated in
the Convention, "the nec.essity of secrecy in the case of treaties
forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature" 71-large
bodies being thought incapable of preserving secrecy. This cir-
cumstance, said James Wilson, "formed the only objection ' 72 to
inclusion of the House, and a similar explanation was made in the
several ratification conventions. 7 3  Once, however, a treaty is de-
these amendments by its convention. They were usually prepared by a committee, the
report of which was subsequently adopted in a perfunctory manner; for it was recognized
that it was only a recommendation." R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 152-53 (1926) (foot-
note omitted).
66 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 592.
67 Id. at 595.
6 Id. at 507 (Marshall), 497 (Pendleton), 431, 545 (Randolph).
69 See note 49 supra.
70 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 466.
71 Id. at 538.
72 Id.
71 In the South Carolina Convention, Pierce Butler and C.C. Pinckney, delegates to the
Federal Convention, so explained (see 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 272); in the Virginia
Convention, Francis Corbin (3 id. at 466).
286 [Vol. 64:275
PANAMA CANAL
bated and ratified by the Senate, the necessity for secrecy, and
therefore, the reason for further exclusion of the House, is at an
end. At that point, James Wilson's assurance to the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention has special significance: "[T]he house of
representatives possess no active part in making treaties, yet their
legislative authority will be found to have strong restraining influ-
ence upon both president and senate." 7' As said by James
Iredell in the North Carolina Convention, "it would be very im-
proper if the senate had authority to prevent the house of rep-
resentatives from protecting the people." 75 To the contrary, he
stated: "Our representatives may at any time compel the senate to
agree to a reasonable measure, by withholding supplies [money]
till the measure is consented to." 76 In sum, it was one thing to
insist that, in the performance of its own function, the Senate
should act by a two-thirds vote, and something else again to court
the wrath of those who placed their faith in the more democratic
House and were already displeased with the exclusion of the
House from treatymaking by further reducing its role under arti-
cle IV. There is not the faintest intimation in the constitutional
history of an intention to do so.
When the Edwards majority relies on the failure of the "effort
at the Constitutional Convention to introduce House participation in
ratification of treaties," 77 it fails to distinguish between the
treatymaking process, from which the House is excluded, and the
necessity of subsequent action by the House, which takes a treaty
out of the self-executing category. That distinction was drawn in
1796 by the House during the debate on the Jay Treaty, in the
shape of a resolution adopted by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-
five: 78
[Tihe House of Representatives do not claim any agency in
making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty stipulates regulations
on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the
power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as to such
stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress. 7
9
74 2 id. at 469. This remark was cited with approval in the Jay Treaty debates by Wil-
liam Findley (5 ANNALS OF CONG. 592 (1796)), Albert Gallatin (id. at 737), and Madison (id.
at 775).
75 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 145.
76 Id. at 142.
77 580 F.2d at 1060 (emphasis added).
78 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1796).
79 Id. at 771.
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As Madison explained, such construction "left with the PRESIDENT
and Senate the power of making Treaties, but required at the
same time the Legislative sanction and cooperation, in those cases
where the Constitution had given express and specific powers to the
Legislature." 80 That distinction was also drawn by John Mar-
shall, who had been a member of the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention, then engaged in defending the Jay Treaty. The question
raised, wrote his biographer, Albert Beveridge, was whether "an
international compact requiring an appropriation of money ...
could be made without the concurrence of the House as well as
the Senate." 81 Marshall argued that it was " 'more in the spirit of
the Constitution' for the National House to refuse support after
ratification than to have a treaty 'stifled in embryo' by the House
passing upon it before ratification." 82
The debate on the Jay Treaty, as Madison stated, "was the
first time the Treaty-making power had come under formal and
accurate discussion." 83 It was wide-ranging and acute, and, in
the end, proponents of the House function prevailed by a thump-
ing majority. So far as the House is entitled to construe its own
powers, their views represent the legislative history.
Washington had kept the Jay Treaty under wraps for four
months "before he could bring himself to submit it to the Sen-
ate"; 84 it blew up a "storm of popular protest." 85 Jefferson
called it "an execrable thing," 86 and, like the Panama Treaty, it
was embroiled in heated controversy. The issue was whether the
House was entitled to certain documents at the ratification stage.
Washington refused to supply them on the ground that the
House was not a party to treatymaking, and stated in passing that
when it was proposed in the Convention "'that no Treaty should
be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,'"
g0 Id. at 493 (emphasis added). See id. at 774. As Albert Gallatin stated: The power of
the House "was not an active and operative power of making and repealing Treaties ... it
was only a negative, a restraining power on those subjects over which Congress had the
right to legislate." Id. at 745.
s1 2 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 134 (1916).
82 Id. at 135. Robert Goodloe Harper, with Marshall, a protagonist of the Jay Treaty,
said: "We all admitted here that Congress may refuse to execute a Treaty, but we contend
that it has nothing to do with making the Treaty." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (1796).
83 Id. at 781.
84 S. BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY at xiii (1923).
85 2 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 874 (1962).
86 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (Nov. 30, 1795), reprinted in 7
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 39, 40 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
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the "proposition was explicitly rejected." 7 Madison politely re-
marked that "he had no recollection of it"; Il and, in fact,
Washington was mistaken. The Journal of the Convention to
which he cited contains no such entry; 89 perhaps he had refer-
ence to Roger Sherman's above-quoted remark.90  But Sherman
made no formal motion and, therefore, it did not come to a vote;
what was approved immediately thereafter was the deletion of
Madison's "exception" of peace treaties from a two-thirds vote.
Madison, not Washington, was the architect of the Constitution;
he and the decided majority of the House stood fast for their role
"where Legislative objects are embraced by Treaties." 91 Madison
justly maintained that
if the Treaty power alone could perform any one act for which
the authority of Congress is required by the Constitution, it
may perform every act for which the authority of that part of
the Government is required. Congress have power to regulate
trade, to declare war, to raise armies, to levy, to borrow, and
appropriate money, &c. If, by Treaty, therefore, as paramount
to the Legislative power, the PRESIDENT and Senate can regulate
trade, they can also declare war, they can raise armies to carry
on war, and they can procure money to support armies. These
powers, however different in their nature or importance, are
on the same footing in the Constitution, and must share the
same fate.
92
By the same token, the President may by treaty "constitute Tri-
bunals inferior to the supreme Court," 9 3 "provide and maintain a
Navy,"94 and "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union."95  All are subsumed in article I, section,8
under "The Congress shall have power." The Framers, I suggest,
would have been aghast at the notion that a foreign power could
participate in the ordering of such internal matters.
Madison likewise pointed out that
[t]he specific powers, as vested in Congress by the Constitution,
are qualified by sundry exceptions, deemed of great importance
87 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (1796).
88 Id. at 776.
s9 See id. at 533-34, 544.
90 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
91 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 548.
92 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 490 (1796).
93 U.S CONST. art I, § 8: cl. 9.
91 Id. cl. 13.
95 Id. cl. 15.
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to the safe exercise of them .... Now, if the Legislative powers,
specifically vested in Congress, are to be no limitation or check
to the Treaty power, it was evident that the exceptions to those
powers, could be no limitation or check to the Treaty power.
96
As Abraham Baldwin, who also had been a delegate to the Con-
stitutional Convention, stated, the treatymaking branch would
"stand distinguished as an indefinite, uncontrolled branch of the
Government, the extent of whose powers was to be known only by
its own acts." 9 He "believed he might say with safety that it was
at least a mode of taking away the'Legislative powers of the Fed-
eral Government that had not before been much contem-
plated." 98 Albert Gallatin, who was to become a brilliant Secretary
of the Treasury, chimed in that this "truly novel doctrine" 9 9 could
prostrate "the sacred principle that the people could not be bound
without the consent of their immediate Representatives," 100 a
breach spectacularly illustrated by the transfer of the Panama
Canal without the participation of the House.
For the opposition, Chauncey Goodrich retorted that, on the
Madison principle, "[a]ll the objects so often alluded to are en-
tirely withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Executive. If we
adopt the principle we cannot restrain its full operation. There is
no middle ground." 101 That is equally true of the sweeping
claims on behalf of the treaty power, as Madison noted. It is dif-
ficult to conclude, however, that the Framers, after carefully
enumerating the legislative powers-conferred on the one body
that had enjoyed their confidence in the colonial and 1776-1787
periods 1 0 2-would grant unbridled treaty power to the President
and Senate to take over those powers by a compact with a foreign
nation. Whether it be a declaration of war or the creation of in-
ferior courts, surely the Framers did not intend to share such
powers with a foreign nation to the exclusion of the popularly-
96 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 491 (1796). See also the remarks of Samuel Smith, id. at 623.
97 Id. at 536.
91 Id. at 537. Gallatin said: "The power of making Treaties being granted in an unde-
fined manner, may, if it is understood not to be restrained by the specific Legislative pow-
ers of Congress, embrace and supersede every one of them ... [and thus] restrain the
future exercise of legislation upon any subject whatever." Id. at 738-39.
99 Id. at 738.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 723-24.
102 R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 49-50 (1974). In 1791,
James Wilson found it necessary to admonish the American people that it was time to
regard the Executive and judges equally with the Legislature as representatives of the
people. 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 293 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
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elected House, the darling of the people. Were the American
people constrained to choose between an unlimited treaty power
in derogation of the powers of Congress and a comprehensive
legislative check on the treaty power, they would, it may confi-
dently be asserted, place their trust in Congress. Like Madison,
they would conclude that "that construction ought to be favored
which would preserve the mutual control between the Senate and
the House of Representatives, rather than that which gave powers
to the Senate not controllable by, and paramount over those of
the House of Representatives." 103
Certainly the cession by treaty of territory or property belong-
ing to the United States was beyond the pale. For this we have the
unequivocal authority of Hamilton, exponent of the broadest
treaty power. In his "Letters of Camillus," written in ddfense of
the Jay Treaty, he commented on article IV:
As to the disposal & regulation of the territory and prop-
erty of the U States, this will be naturally understood of disposi-
tions and regulations purely domestic and where the title is not
disputed by a foreign power. Where there are interfering claims of
foreign powers, as neither will acknowlege the right of the
other to decide, TREATY must directly or indirectly adjust the
dispute.1
0 4
103 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 374.
104 Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Camillus) (New York Jan. 6, 1796) (emphasis
added), reprinted in 20 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 13, 21. His
remarks were addressed to the contention that the Constitution "is ... violated in that part,
which empowers Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory orother property of the U States, by those provisions of the Treaty
which respect the adjustment boundary in the cases of the Rivers St. Croix & Mississippi."
Id. at 14.
Another remark by Hamilton calls for notice: "Our treaties with several Indian Nations
regulate and change the boundaries between them & the U States." Hamilton, The Defence
No. XXXVIIl (Camillus) (New York Jan. 9, 1796), reprinted in 20 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON, supra note 47, at 22, 31. He cites the treaty with the Northwestern Indians, which
relinquishes to the Indians a large tract of land which they had, by preceding treaties,
ceded to the United States. Id. at 31. Syrett identifies the Treaty of August 3, 1795, 7 Stat.
49, which is reproduced in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED
STATES 525 (C.E. Carter ed. 1934). No cession of property held by the United States is
revealed by that treaty. Article 3 recites that the Indians "cede & relinquish forever" all
their claims to described lands, and they further "cede to the United States" certain par-
cels. Article 4 recites that in consideration
of the cessions and relinquishments of lands made in the preceding Arti-
cle.., the United States relinquish their claims to all other [described] Indian
lands .... But from this relinquishment by the United States, the following tracts
of land, are explicitly excepted.... To which several parcels of land so ex-
cepted, the said tribes relinquish all the title and claim which they ... may have.
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Title of the United States to the millions upon millions of dollars
of property in the Canal Zone that it acquired by purchase is
beyond dispute, and its right "in perpetuity [of] the use, occupa-
tion and control" of the Canal Zone was expressly conferred by
the 1903 Panama Treaty. Some may urge that such "use" was
procured by undue influence upon a fledgling nation, but
Panama owed its very existence to that grant. As well unravel the




Down the years, the Madisonian view has won the sanction of
the Senate itself. A report in 1816 by the managers for the House
on a conference with managers for the Senate concerning a con-
vention to regulate commerce between Great Britain and the
United, States stated:
[I]t is by no means the intention of the Senate to assert the
treaty-making power to be in all cases independent of the legis-
lative authority. So far from it, that they are believed to
acknowledge the necessity of legislative enactment to carry into
execution all treaties which contain stipulations requiring ap-
propriations, or which might bind the nation to lay taxes, to
raise armies, to support navies, to grant subsidies ... or to cede
territory; if indeed this power exists in the Government at all. In
some or all of these cases, and probably in many others, it is
conceived to be admitted, that the legislative body must act, in
order to give effect and operation to a treaty ..... 106
In 1844, the Senate adopted the position that the constitu-
tional method of regulating duties was by legislation rather than by
treaty. A report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rec-
ommended rejection of a treaty (the treaty was then laid on the
table by a vote of twenty-six to eighteen) on the ground that
Thus, the treaty makes a studied distinction between the cessions by the Indians, and the
relinquishment of claims by the United States. As Hamilton said in respect to the Jay
Treaty, "[tlhis treaty contains the establishment of a boundary line between the parties
which, in part, is arbitrary and could not have been predicated upon precise antecedent
right." Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVIII (Camillus) (New York Jan. 9, 1796), reprinted in
20 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 22, 29.
105 S. MORISON, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 57 (1965).
106 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1019 (1816) (emphasis added). Madison and Gallatin denied the
existence of such a power. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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the Legislature is the department of Government by which
commerce should be regulated and the laws of revenue be passed.
The Constitution, in terms, communicates the power to
regulate commerce and to impose duties to that department. It
communicates it, in terms, to no other.... [T]he general rule
of our system is indisputably that the control of trade and the
function of taxing belong, without abridgment or participation,
to Congress.... [Als the general rule, the representatives of the
people sitting in their legislative capacity ... may exercise this
power more intelligently, more discreetly ... and may better
discern what true policy prescribes and rejects, than is within
the competence of the executive department of the Govern-
ment.1
07
In December 1942, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, addressing the argument that the
disposition of waterworks and some property of the Panama Rail-
road should be by treaty, said:
The Constitution itself confers on Congress specific authority to
transfer territory or lands belonging to the United States....
[I]f we had a formal treaty before us and if it should be
ratified, it still would be necessary for the Congress to pass an
act vesting in the Republic of Panama the title to the particular
tracts of land; because "the Congress" means both bodies. The
House of Representatives has a right to a voice as to whether
any transfer of real estate or other property shall be made
either under treaty or otherwise.' 0 8
A little later he added: "[It would be necessary to have congres-
sional action even though there were a treaty.... congressional
action parting with title to these properties." 1'9 The position was
upheld by a vote of forty to twenty-nine."10
"To hold that the enumerated powers [of Congress] are by
implication excluded from the treaty power," the 1978 report of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated, "would be to hold
that hundreds of self-executing treaties dealing with such subjects
as foreign commerce, copyrights, patents, and postal services are
107 6 S. EXEC. J. 334 (1887), reprinted in 2 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REP-
RFSENTATIVES 999 (1907).
108 88 CONG. REC. 9267 (1942).
109 Id. at 9269. The next day, Senator Tunnell stated: "There is no other method or
authority to dispose of property of the Nation than that which is reposed in the Congress."
Id. at 9322. For an example of a State Department submission of a picayune transfer to
Panama for authorization by Congress, see note 227 and accompanying text infra.
110 88 CONG. REc. 9329 (1942).
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invalid.""' 1  But arrangements by the executive department for
the reciprocal receipt and delivery of mail were authorized by the
Act of February 20, 1792.112 Under later legislation, executive
agreements were authorized by which American copyrights and
trademarks secured protection abroad in return for protection by
the United States of similar rights of foreign origin.' 3  When, in
1883, the President entered into an international convention for
the reciprocal protection of industrial property, 114 Attorney Gen-
eral Miller advised the Secretary of the Interior that this stipula-
tion is "not self-executing, but requires legislation to render it ef-
fective." 15 His opinion was approved by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Rousseau v. Brown. t1 6 As
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 117
"against ... [a] prior longstanding and consistent administrative
interpretation ... [a] more recent ad hoc contention as to how the
statute should be construed cannot stand." 118
The majority in Edwards v. Carter draws distinctions where the
Founders saw none. Thus it explains that the article I, section 7,
clause 1 language-"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives" -is "restrictive" and prohibits
"the use of the treaty power to impose taxes." 119 "All Bills ...
shall originate" is no more "restrictive" than "Congress shall have
Power to dispose." Attorney General Griffin Bell conceded that
the Senate and President may not "bypass the power of Congress
111 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 66. If the conduct was wrong ab
initio, it cannot be legitimized by repetition. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47
(1969).
112 Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 239.
113 S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT §§ 63-64 (2d ed. 1916).
114 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372,
T.S. No. 379.
115 19 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 273, 279 (1889).
116 21 App. D.C. 73, 76-77 (1903). Two decades later, a patent controversy drew into
issue the effect of a provision of the 1921 treaty of peace between the United States and
Germany (Treaty of Berlin, Aug. 25, 1921, United States-Germany, art. 2, § 5, 42 Stat.
1939, T.S. No. 658); the courts followed Rousseau and the opinion of Attorney General
Miller in finding the provision not to be self-executing. See Robertson v. General Elec. Co.,
32 F.2d 495, 499-502 (4th Cir., cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929); In re Stoffregen, 56 D.C.
App. 23, 23-24, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 569 (1925). See also Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City
of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913).
117 350 U.S. 383 (1956).
118 Id. at 396. In General Elec. Co. v. Robertson, 21 F.2d 214 (D. Md. 1927), rev'd, 32
F.2d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929) where the government strongly urged
the view "that a treaty affecting patents is not intended to go into effect until ratified by
Congress" (id. at 220), the court plaintively commented on the "varying attitude which the
government from time to time has assumed" on this issue (id. at 221).
119 580 F.2d at 1058.
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and in particular the House of Representatives over the purse-
strings."' 2 ° Why may not one-hundred thousand dollars be "ex-
pended" by treaty while a "national treasure beyond compare"
may be given away? The Framers were not so irrational as to in-
sist that the President could not purchase property without con-
gressional assent, but that once purchased he could give it away.
To the contrary, Hamilton conceded that property to which the
United States had undisputed title could not be disposed of by
treaty.12 1 Again, the majority finds in article I, section 9, clause
7-"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law"-an example of a
grant of authority that is by its "very terms, exclusive." 122 Sup-
pose it read "Money shall be drawn from the Treasury by Ap-
propriations made by Law." Would this be less "restrictive" than
"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Rep-
resentatives"? The majority grudgingly concedes that "[t]he sui
generis nature of a declaration of war and the unique history indi-
cating the Framers' desire to have both Houses of Congress con-
cur in such a declaration, may place it apart from the other con-
gressional powers enumerated in Art. I, § 8 and in Art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2." 123 To the Founders, who revolted against "taxation with-
out representation," taxation was no less sui generis than a decla-
ration of war. And the "unique history" avouched by the majority
refers to the "Congress," not to the House; it was not suggested
that "both Houses ... [must] concur in such a declaration" for it
was assumed that "Congress" referred to both Houses, as the
Constitution provides. The war power, declared James Wilson and
Hamilton, was vested in Congress, exactly as are all the other
powers conferred by article I, section 8 and article IV, section
2.124 The implausibility of the majority's distinctions underlines
Madison's statement that if
the PRESIDENT and Senate can regulate trade, they can also de-
clare war, they can raise armies to carry on war, and they can
120 Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 209 (statement of Att'y Gen.
Bell).
121 See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
122 580 F.2d at 1058.
123 Id. at 1058 n.7 (emphasis added).
124 R. BERGER, supra note 102, at 61, 67. And despite the "unique history" of the "decla-
ration of" war clause," a succession of Presidents and the State Department have insisted
that 125 self-serving presidential "precedents" authorized the President to commit the na-
tion to war without a congressional declaration of war, first in Korea, then in Vietnam. See
id. at 75-88. Why should the State Department's "cession" precedents enjoy a higher status
than the now discredited presidential warmaking "precedents"?
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procure money to support armies. These powers, however dif-
ferent in their nature or importance, are all on the same foot-




As the majority in Edwards v. Carter noted, "none of the actual
holdings in these cases addressed the precise issue before us-
whether the property clause prohibits the transfer of United
States property to foreign nations through self-executing
treaties." 126 But there-is a line of cases that categorically declares
the power conferred by article IV to be "exclusive." So Sioux Tribe
of Indians v. United States 127 holds that "the Constitution places the
authority to dispose of public lands exclusively in Congress"; 128
and Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Price County 129 declares that arti-
cle IV "implies an exclusion of all other authority over the prop-
erty which could interfere with this right." 130" Such utterances
are thrust aside by the majority as "dicta." 131 Dicta, however, are
statements not necessary to the decision, 132 whereas in Wisconsin
Central Railroad, for example, the "implied exclusion" was the
basis of the decision that state authority over federal lands is sub-
ordinate to that of Congress.' 33  Next, the majority argues that
such "dicta" are confined to showing "a lack of any constitutional
basis for exercise of authority by individual states over United
125 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 490 (1796).
126 580 F.2d at 1061. -
127 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
128 Id. at 326.
129 133 U.S. 496 (1890).
130 Id. at 504.
11 580 F.2d at 1061.
112 Where a matter was "not really in question.., what was said of it cannot control
here where the very point is presented for decision." Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249
U.S. 275, 286 (1919).
13' Wisconsin Central Railroad, the Edwards majority states, decided that "United States
property is not subject to state taxation since enforcement of such a tax might result in
states, instead of Congress, controlling the disposition of federal property contrary to Art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2." 580 F.2d at 1061 n.18. A later and similar utterance by the Court-"The
power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States 'is
vested in Congress without limitation'" (Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (quot-
ing United States v. Mideast Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)))-is thrust aside by the
majority because the "salient" question "was whether Congress could grant to individual
states indefeasible title to and ownership of certain resources under submerged marginal
ocean lands" (580 F.2d at 1061 n.18). That these cases do not examine the treaty power
does not impeach the "exclusivity" principle on which the decisions are grounded.
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States property." 134 But by the majority's own version, Sioux
Tribe "held that the President could not by Executive Order dispose
of public lands without congressional authorization," 135 thus
negating the majority's "confinement" of article IV to state-federal
relations and laying down that the power of Congress is "exclu-
sive" as against the President, thereby formulating a principle that
can embrace his treaty power. Such decisions are consistent with
the general principle earlier expressed by Justice Story: "The
power of congress over the public territory is clearly exclusive and
universal; and their legislation is subject to no control; but is abso-
lute, and unlimited, unless so far as it is affected by stipulations in
the cessions .... "136 By "cessions" I take it that Story had refer-
ence to cessions to the United States since he had earlier written
of foreign cessions by treaty. 137  For him, therefore, the treaty
power in no way limited the "absolute and unlimited" power of
Congress to "dispose" unless a particular treaty so stipulated with
respect to territory ceded to the United States, as did an earlier
Spanish treaty 138 by "reserving" individual parcels from the ces-
sion. Story was the only Justice in our history to examine every
portion of the Constitution with great care and to publish a mas-
sive commentary that stands as a landmark of constitutional
exegesis. His studied conclusion carries great weight and, in truth,
reflects traditional canons of construction.
A. The Indian Treaty Cases
Faithfully following in the path of the administration's argu-
ments, the Edwards majority employs a double standard-
dismissing unfavorable pronouncements that were necessary for
decision while reading undeniable dicta as Holy Writ. What it re-
gards as the "leading case on the power to convey such
[government] land by self-executing treaty" '139 is Holden v. Joy,
140
the sheerest dictum, for the Court itself, as Attorney General Bell
134 580 F.2d at 1061.
135 Id. at 1061 n.18 (first emphasis added).
136 3 J. STORY, supra note 22, § 1322, at 198.
137 Id. §§ 1277-83.
138 See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, art.
VIII, 8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327, construed in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
(1833). The Supreme Court also addressed such a "reservation" (see Treaty with the Chip-
pewa Indians, Oct. 2, 1863, art. IX, 13 Stat. 667) in Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
See notes 154-55 and accompanying text infra.
139 580 F.2d at 1062.
140 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872).
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noted, "conceded that the question was immaterial in the case at
bar because Congress had actually implemented and ratified that
particular treaty."141 "[S]ubsequent ratification," it needs to be
remembered, "is equivalent to original authority." 142 Holden in-
volved one of a series of Indian treaties which arose out of the
nationalo policy of opening up Indian lands for settlement by ex-
changing for them territory farther west. Thus Congress, by the
Act of May 28, 1830,143 authorized the exchange of western lands
for the Indians' eastern lands in connection with their removal to
lands west of the Mississippi.1 44 The Treaty of December 29,
1835,145 which made such an exchange, somewhat exceeded the
statutory authorization, 146 but Congress soon appropriated
$4,500,000 to carry out the treaty, 147 and thereby, as Judge Mac-
Kinnon noted, "had in effect ratified" the ultra vires transfer to
the Indians.148  It is against this background that the Holden
Court stated:
IS]till it is insisted that the President and Senate, in concluding
[a treaty for the transfer of property], could not lawfully cov-
enant that a patent should issue to convey lands which be-
longed to the United States .... On the contrary, there are
many authorities where it is held that a treaty may convey to a
grantee good title to such lands without an act of Congress con-
ferring it .... 149
Seldom in the annals of the Court have citations to "au-
thorities" been so far afield, as I discovered when I examined
them 150 and as Judge MacKinnon more abundantly dem-
onstrates. 151 Half of the citations are wholly irrelevant and the
other half involve "reserves" from the cessions made by the In-
dians to which title did not, therefore, pass to the United States.
And the Holden Court itself added that "it is not necessary to de-
141 Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 207. See Holden v. Joy, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 247 (1872). The Edwards majority agrees that "the Court found it
unnecessary to rest its decision on this constitutional basis." 580 F.2d at 1062.
142 Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32 (1907).
143 Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
144 See 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 237-38.
145 Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.
146 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 239-40. See Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
147 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 247. See Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 267, 5 Stat. 73.
148 580 F.2d at 1092 (dissenting opinion).
149 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 247.
150 See Appendix.
151 580 F.2d at 1092-94 & n.37 (dissenting opinion).
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cide the question in this case" as the provisions of the treaty "have
been repeatedly recognized by Congress as valid." 152 Such is the
dictum that the majority exalts to the status of a "principle." With
Chief Judge Cardozo, one exclaims, "I own that it is a good deal
of a mystery to me how judges, of all persons in the world, should
put their faith in dicta." 153
Next the majority invokes Jones v. Meehan,154 where the treaty
provided: "IT]here shall be set apart from the tract hereby ceded
[to the United States by the Indians] a reservation of (640) six
hundred and forty acres near the mouth of Thief River for the
chief Moose Dung .... ,"155 The issue was what kind of title he
took. Light on the nature of that title had been cast by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall: "It has never been contended that the Indian title
amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been
questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ul-
timate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclu-
sive power of acquiring that right" 1 5 6-what Marshall at another
point described as "the exclusive right to purchase from the In-
dians." 157 As Holden v. Joy later held, discovery "gave the exclu-
sive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of
the right of the possessor to sell." 158 A word about the
mechanics of these "reserves." The Supreme Court noted that the
Indian tribes "held their respective lands and territories each in
common, the individuals of each tribe ... holding ... in common
with each other, and there being among them no separate prop-
erty in the soil." 159 Consequently, "the usual mode adopted by
the Indians for granting lands to individuals, has been to reserve
them in a treaty .... 60 In an Opinion of the Attorney General,
Roger Taney held that
[t]hese reservations are excepted out of the grant made by the
treaty, and did not therefore pass by it: consequently, the title
152 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 247.
153 B. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 29 (1921).
154 175 U.S. 1 (1889), discussed in Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
"' Treaty with the Chippewa Indians, Oct. 2, 1863, art. IX, 13 Stat. 667, quoted in Jones
v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 4 (1899).
156 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823) (emphasis added).
157 Id. at 585.
158 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 244. Compare the view of the Supreme Court that use and
occupation of the Panama Canal amounted to title, set out in note 59 supra.
159 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 549-50 (1823).
160 Id. at 598.
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remains as it was before the treaty; that is to say, the lands
reserved are still held under the original Indian title.
161
The Edwards majority states that 'Jones v. Meehan discussed
and rejected as irreconcilable with later Supreme Court opinions
the contrary views expressed by Attorney General Taney." ' 62 This
is only partially true. The Court in Meehan quoted from Doe v.
Wilson: 163
The reservees took by the treaty, directly from the nation, the
Indian title .... The treaty itself converted the reserved sec-
tions into individual property. ... [A]s a part of the consideration
for the cession, certain individuals of the nation had conferred
on them [by the tribe] portions of the land, to which the United
States title was either added or promised to be added .... [I]t is
manifest that sales of reserved sections were contemplated, as
the lands ceded were forthwith to be surveyed, sold and inhab-
ited by a white population, among whom the Indians could not
remain.
164
It is against this background that the Court stated: "Taney's opin-
ion .. . that the treaty rather confirmed the Indian right than
granted a new title, can hardly be reconciled with the later judg-
ments of the court" 16 5 -the reason being that the United States
had "added" its "right of purchase" to the Indians' right of occu-
pancy in order to insure that white purchasers from Indians
would obtain title, not merely the Indians' right of possession.
Without such title, the government's purpose to displace the In-
dians by white settlers would have been aborted.
This "addition" leads the Edwards majority to conclude that
the treaties "clearly disposed of United States property in-
terests," 166 and to rely on the Meehan statement that "good title to
parts of the lands of an Indian tribe may be granted to individu-
161 2 Op. AT'YY GEN. 587, 588 (1833), quoted in Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 12 (1899).
162 580 F.2d at 1062 n.19.
163 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457 (1860).
164 175 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457, 463-64 (1860)
(emphasis added)). The continued validity of Taney's statement that land "reserved" to
individual Indians does not pass to the United States may be gathered from Francis v.
Francis, 203 U.S. 233 (1906), which quotesJones v. Meehan for the proposition that when a
treaty makes "'a reservation . . . of a specified number of sections of land ... the treaty
itself converts the reserved land into individual property.' " Id. at 238 (quoting Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 21 (1899)).
165 175 U.S. at 13-14.
166 580 F.2d at 1062.
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als ... without any act of Congress." 167 No act of Congress was
needed, in my judgment, because Congress, within a year after
Taney's opinion, had departed from its prohibition of "purchases
or leases from 'any Indian'" and adopted the Act of June 30,
1834,168 from which Meehan inferred that thenceforth there
would not be "any general restriction upon the alienation by indi-
vidual Indians of sections of land reserved to them respectively by
a treaty with the United States." 169 This statutory permission to
alienate Indian lands may be read as a tacit consent to the addi-
tion by the United States of its "right of purchase" to the Indians'
right to possess in order not to perpetrate a fraud on white pur-
chasers. It was an implementation of the settled policy to move
the Indians westward; such "additions" are hardly to be compared
to the disposal of the Panama Canal.
B. Miscellaneous Citations
No discussion of the cases would be complete without refer-
ence to two cited on behalf of the administration but discreetly
jettisoned by the majority, presumably because their irrelevance
was too obvious. Their transparent irrelevance should have
cautioned the majority that argumentation which grasps at such
straws betrays a shaky scaffolding. Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Ad-
visor to the State Department, cited Missouri v. Holland 1" in sup-
port of "[t]he power to dispose of public land ... by treaty." 171
That case arose out of a challenge by Missouri to legislation
executing a convention with Great Britain for the protection of
migratory birds that annually traversed parts of the United States
and Canada.1 7 1 Justice Holmes, addressing the argument that
the convention infringed powers reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment, stated: "Wild birds are not in possession of
anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole
167 175 U.S. at 10, quoted in Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
168 Ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729.
169 175 U.S. at 13.
170 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
171 Panama Canal Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1977) (testimony of Herbert J.
Hansell) [hereinafter cited as Senate Judiciary Hearings].
172 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act; ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). The convention called
for such legislation. See Convention on Migratory Birds, Dec. 8, 1916, United States-Great
Britain, art. VIII, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
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foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their juris-
diction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be
in another State and in a week a thousand miles away."1 7 3 Con-
sequently, the state could assert no "title" in migratory birds, nor,
on the same reasoning, could the United States. The case is there-
fore utterly irrelevant to the power by treaty to dispose of prop-
erty belonging to the United States.
Geqfroy v. Riggs 174 was cited by Dean Louis Pollak,17S whom
the majority in Edwards v. Carter included in its list of "authorities
in agreement" with the conclusion of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.' 6 Geofroy held that a Frenchman could inherit prop-
erty in the District of Columbia under a convention providing for
reciprocal rights of inheritance by citizens of the signators.'
77
Dean Pollak considers that
Geofroy v. Riggs is a particularly strong illustration of the capac-
ity of treaties to regulate matters delegated to Congress: That
case applied a treaty to rights of inheritance in the District of
Columbia, notwithstanding that Article I, § 8(17) confers on
Congress the power of "exclusive legislation in all cases what-
soever" relating to the District.
178
Inheritance of private property sheds no light on the power to
dispose of government property by treaty. Moreover, the 1853
convention conferred the right only in states "whose existing laws
permit it" ' (the Court held the District of Columbia a state for
purposes of the treaty180), and although the Act of March 3,
1887 81 forbade ownership of land in the District to aliens, it ex-
cepted the disposition of lands "secured by existing treaties,""'
which the Court held included realty "acquired by inheri-
,73 252 U.S. at 434.
174 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
,75 124 CONG. REC. S729 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
176 580 F.2d at 1057 n.4.
177 Consular Convention with France, Feb. 23, 1853, United States-France, 10 Stat. 992,
T.S. No. 92, quoted in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 268 (1890).
178 124 CONG. REC. S732 n.6 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
179 Consular Convention with France, Feb. 23, 1853, United States-France, art. VII, 10
Stat. 992, T.S. No. 92.
180 133 U.S. at 268-69.
I'l Ch. 340, 24 Stat. 476, cited in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 272 (1890).
182 The Act prohibited alien ownership of land in the District of Columbia, "Provided,
That the prohibition of this section shall not apply to cases in which the right to hold or
dispose of lands in the United States is secured by existing treaties to the citizens or sub-
jects of foreign countries." Id. § 1.
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tance." 183 Thus the convention did not pretend to override local




The "precedents" cited by the administration and adopted by
the Edwards majority should be measured by Lord Chief Justice
Denman's observation that "[t]he practice of a ruling power in the
State is but a feeble proof of its legality."1 84 One need only to
recall the "precedents" summoned by the State Department to jus-
tify presidential warmaking in Korea and in Vietnam to be skepti-
cal of such self-serving actions.' 8 5 The "vast majority" of those
precedents, said Edward Corwin, "involved fights with pirates,
landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-
barbarous coasts" to protect stranded Americans, and the like.'
8 6
From these the State Department conjured a presidential power
single-handed to commit the nation to war. The cited treaties are
little better precedents for the disposition by treaty of undeniable
property of the United States.
A. The Boundary Treaties
The majority dismisses as irrelevant the fact that "many pre-
vious treaties couched in self-executing terms ... [dealt] with
boundary issues."' 187  It finds it "exceedingly difficult to under-
stand why the constitutionality of utilization of the treaty process
should depend on whether the nation to which the land is con-
veyed has previously 'claimed' such land."188 The "difficulty"
arises from the assumption that "land is conveyed"-from a fail-
ure to distinguish between a "claim" and ownership. One can
"claim" the moon. When two nations lay claim to the same terri-
tory, neither may unilaterally "dispose" of it. The conflicting
183 133 U.S. at 272.
184 Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839).
11" See Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIEmTAM
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 711 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
186 Corwin, The President's Powers, 124 NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1951, at 15, 16, reprinted
in THE PRESIDENT: ROLES AND POWERS 360, 361 (D. Haight & L. Johnston eds. 1965). See
R. BERGER, supra note 102, at 75-86.
187 580 F.2d at 1063.
188 Id. at 1064 n.23.
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claims must be settled by a compromise-a treaty for mutual sur-
render of inflated claims in return for undisputed title to a lesser
area. Only then is it possible to determine who has what. A happy
example-the Spanish claim to the Far West-is instanced by
Judge MacKinnon, who draws the proper conclusion:
Since ... Spain claimed the western lands to the 42d parallel,
the fact of their claim, based as it was on the recognized right
of discovery, some minimal exploration in the most far reach-
ing regions and very minor settlement, when that claim is rec-
ognized in a treaty by the United States it is almost impossible
to conclude in view of our negligible exploration or settlement
of the fringes of the Spanish claim that the United States was
actually disposing of territory or property belonging to it. What
rights we did possess in the eastern area flowed from the
Louisiana Purchase from France of what had originally been
territory claimed by Spain. 189
Another example is the dispute relating to the boundary be-
tween Maine and Canada, finally settled by the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842.190 Samuel Eliot Morison recounts
that "[o]nly a scant 200 miles of the easternmost section, from the
Bay of Fundy north, had been determined." 191 A joint commis-
sion "was unable to discover what the treaty of 1783 meant by the
'highlands between the St. Jawrence and the Atlantic
Ocean,'" 9 -a boundary landmark-and when the matter was
referred to the King of the Netherlands for arbitrament, he too
pleaded "inability to locate non-existent highlands." 193 This was
a dispute about unknown boundaries in a vast uncharted wilder-
ness.
What mystifies the Edwards majority was clear enough to
Hamilton, Justice Story and others. Hamilton drew the line be-
tween dispostions where "the title is not disputed" and which
therefore constitute "property" governed by article IV, and cases
where a dispute necessitates adjustment by treaty.' 94 Recognition
of that distinction is exhibited by the correspondence between
Governor Edward Everett of Massachusetts and Justice Story re-
189 Id. at 1083 n.23 (dissenting opinion).
190 Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
191 See S. MORISON, supra note 105, at 407.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
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specting the Northeastern boundary that, in Everett's words, pre-
sented "a question not of ceding an admitted portion of the ter-
ritory of Maine, but of ascertaining the boundary between the
British territory and ours." 195 Story concurred, writing that "in a
case of contested boundary, there is no pretence to say that an
ascertainment of the true boundary involves the question of ces-
sion." 196 Others have since joined in that opinion.
197
B. Treaties Cited By Edwards v. Carter
A number of treaties are cited by the Edwards majority "which
cede land or other property assertedly owned by the United
States." 198  They are drawn from a list contained in the report of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and "supplied by [the]
Department of State," of instances "in which property belonging
to the United States Government has, according to the Executive
Branch, been transferred by treaty." 199 The Committee was be-
trayed by its reliance on the executive branch, as its citation to the
1971 treaty with Honduras respecting the Swan Islands 20 0 speed-
ily discloses. In its 1972 report on this treaty the Committee
stated:
The Swan Islands are rock keys located in the Caribbean about
98 miles off the coast of Honduras. The islands have no intrin-
sic value and the largest of the two islands is only two miles
long and one-half mile wide. The only U.S. interest in these
19' Letter from Governor Everett to Justice Story (Apr. 14, 1838), reprinted in 2 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 286, 287 (W. Story ed. 1851).
19' Letter from Justice Story to Governor Everett (Apr. 17, 1838), reprinted in 2 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 195, at 287, 288.
197 "A treaty for the determination of a disputed line operates not as a treaty of cession,
but of recognition." S. CRANDALL, supra note 113, § 99, at 226. Willoughby states:
In several treaties in settlement of boundary disputes areas previously
claimed by the United States as its own have been surrendered to foreign pow-
ers. These, however, can scarcely be considered as instances of the alienation of
portions of its own territory, for the fact that the treaties were assented to by
the United States is in itself evidence that it was conceded that the claim that
the areas in question belonged to the United States was unfounded. There has
been no instance in which territory, indisputably belonging to the United States,
has been alienated to another power.
1 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 317, at 572 (2d ed.
1929).
198 580 F.2d at 1063.
'99 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.




islands is the operation and maintenance of a meteorological
observation and telecommunications facility and an air naviga-
tion beacon. The islands are populated by approximately six
Americans .... 201
Some precedent for the multibillion dollar Panama transfer! To
do the Edwards majority justice, it made no mention of the Swan
Island Treaty. But the four treaties it does cite 202 stand little bet-
ter.
1. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842203
The Treaty of 1842 requires no further discussion.20 4 The
Treaty of 1846 205 itself recited that there was "doubt and uncer-
tainty ... respecting the sovereignty and government of ... the
northwest coast of America, lying westward of the Rocky or Stony
Mountains," 20 6 a classic settlement of a boundary dispute.
2. The Spanish Treaty of February 22, 1819 207
This treaty, ratified on February 19, 1821, had congressional
consent on the heels of ratification in the form of the Act of
March 3, 1821 2 8-legislation to execute the treaty-so that it is
reasonable to infer that they were simultaneously prepared. The
parties "determined to settle and terminate all their differences
and pretensions, by a Treaty ... [to] designate, with precision, the
limits of their respective bordering territories in North
America." 20 9  They agreed upon a boundary west of the Missis-
sippi and reciprocally ceded their "claims and pretensions" on
either side of the boundary to each other.210  A portion of the
boundary referred to the source of the Arkansas River, and, as
Judge MacKinnon points out, "[t]he treaty indicated that the par-
201 S. EXEC. REP. No. 92-94, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
202 580 F.2d at 1063 & n.21.
203 Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
204 See notes 190-93 and accompanying text supra.
2005 July 17, 1846, United States-Great Britain, 9 Stat. 869, T.S. No. 120.
206 Id. Preamble.
207 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, 8 Stat.
252, T.S. No. 327. See note 189 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed this treaty in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
2008 Ch. 39, 3 Stat. 637.
209 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, Pream-
ble, 8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327 (emphasis added).
201 Id. art. III.
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ties did not know the precise source of the Arkansas River and,
particularly in the mountain areas, neither nation was sufficiently
familiar with much of the areas traversed by the newly drawn
boundary lines to know precisely what was accomplished."
211
Again grandiose "claims" to a primeval terra incognita which, to
borrow from Governor Edward Everett, presented "a question not
of ceding an admitted portion" of the United States, "but of ascer-
taining the boundary between the [Spanish] territory and
ours." 212
3. The Japanese Treaty of June 17, 1971 213
This treaty provided for the "reversion" of the Ryukyu and
Daito Islands to Japan, that is, "the return to Japan of administra-
tive rights over these islands. ' 2 4  By article III of the 1951
Treaty of Peace with Japan, 215 the United States, pending its
proposal "to the United Nations to place [the islands] under its
trustqeship system," 216 received the right to exercise "all and any
powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the ter-
ritory and inhabitants of these islands." 217  And it was these
rights that were relinquished by the 1971 treaty. 218  While Japan
renounced in article II of the 1951 treaty "all right, title and
claim" to various territories,21 9 it made no such renunciation with
respect to the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, confirming that the
United States obtained only powers of "administration and legis-
lation." Quoting the Legal Advisor of the State Department that
211 580 F.2d at 1097 (dissenting opinion). Compare Hamilton's reference to "the estab-
lishment of a boundary line.., which, in part, is arbitrary and could not have been predi-
cated upon precise antecedent right." Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVIII (Camillus) (New
York Jan. 9, 1796), reprinted in 20 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 22,
29.
212 Letter from Governor Everett to Justice Story (Apr. 14, 1838), reprinted in 2 LxF AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 195, at 286,.287, quoted in text accompanying note
195 supra.
23 Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, United
States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 446, T.I.A.S. No. 7314.
214 Presidential Proclamation, May 4, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 446, T.I.A.S. No. 7314.
215 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
216 Id. art. III.
217 Id.
218 Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, United
States-Japan, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 446, T.I.A.S. No. 7314.
219 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. II, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490,
136 U.N.T.S. 45.
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"'sovereignty over the Ryukyu ... Islands remains in Japan,' 22 0 a
district court held that there had been no cession.221 The Fourth
Circuit quoted a statement by Ambassador John Foster Dulles, a
delegate to the Japanese Peace Conference, that the 1951 Treaty
of Peace sought "to permit Japan to retain residual
sovereignty" 222 over these islands, and it held that the treaty did
not make "the island a part of the United States.223 No support
for a cession of United States property by self-executing treaty
can be derived from this citation.
4. The Panama Treaty of January 24, 1955224
The Edwards majority states that the Panama Treaty of 1955
transferred certain property (a strip of water and other sites
within the Canal Zone) to Panama without concurring legisla-
tion by the Congress, while transfer of other property (owned
by the United States but within the jurisdiction of Panama) was,
under the terms of the treaty itself, dependent upon concur-
ring legislation by the Congress. The decision to cast some but
not all of the articles of conveyance in non-self-executing form
was a policy choice; it was not required by the Constitution.22 5
The majority's "policy choice" removes into the realm of discre-
tion what hitherto has been considered by the Senate itself as a
constitutional requirement, as when it endorsed Senator Tom
Connally's insistence in 1942 that "it would be necessary to have
congressional action even though there were a treaty. ' 226  Con-
sider a prior "policy choice." In 1932 the State Department sought
an authorization from Congress to transfer some realty in the
Canal Zone to Panama so that the United States might build a
legation thereon in compliance with international law. 227  As
220 United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Hawaii 1954).
221 Id. at 148.
222 Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 721 (4th Cir. 1957).
223 Id. Judge MacKinnon observed that some surplus property may have been trans-
ferred under enactments authorizing the disposition of foreign excess property (see, e.g.,
40 U.S.C. §§ 511-512 (1976)). 580 F.2d at 1098 (dissenting opinion).
224 Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, United States-
Panama, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
225 580 F.2d at 1063.
226 88 CONG. REC. 9269 (1942). See notes 108-10 and accompanying text supra.
227 In the course of the debate in the House on a bill "to authorize the modification of
the boundary line between the Panama Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama" (75
CONG. REC. 4652 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Linthicum)), Representative West remarked:
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Judge MacKinnon points out, the administration "considered it to
be necessary to obtain prior specific congressional authorization
even for a minor disposition." 
228
To recur to the 1955 treaty, article V repeatedly provides that
the several agreements are "subject to the enactment of legislation
by the Congress. ' 229  No such provision is contained in articles
VI and VII, but these, as Judge MacKinnon stressed, only related
to minor boundary matters: "[R]ectification of boundaries is a dis-
tinct matter from the disposition of the staggering amount of
property in question here." 230  "ITIhere comes a point," said
Alexander Bickel, "when a difference of degree achieves the
magnitude of a difference in kind." 231  Rather than to view the
applicability of article IV of the Constitution to be subject to the
State Department's whimsical "policy choice," 2 32 it is preferable to
consider that the Department correctly conformed in article V of
the 1955 Treaty to the prior practice of 1932 and 1942, and
properly treated the minor boundary rectification as requiring no
consent because it did not constitute a cession.23 3  Let congres-
sional acquiescence in de minimis dispositions be assumed, even so
Congress may not abdicate its powers,234 and a fortiori, it cannot
[Tihere is a site within the Panama Canal Zone that is desirable as a site for the
American legation. It is difficult, however, to have an American legation built
upon territory that is technically within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The purpose of this bill, therefore, is to take this parcel of land... and transfer
it, technically, to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. We regain jurisdic-
tion because of the building there of an American legation.
(id. at 4653). The authorization is contained in the Act of May 3, 1932, ch. 162, 47 Stat.
145.
228 580 F.2d at 1084 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). Such "policy choices"
recall the bitter remark of Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, that the State Department "submit[s] many agreements dealing with
the most trivial matters as treaties" but considers that "something that is as important as
the stationing of troops and the payment of millions of dollars ... is proper for an execu-
tive agreement." War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 529 (1971) [hereinafter cited as War Powers Hearings].
229 Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, United States-
Panama, art. V, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
230 580 F.2d at 1083 (dissenting opinion).
231 War Powers Hearings, supra note 228, at 552 (statement of Alexander B. Bickel, Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale University).
232 See note 225 and accompanying text supra.
233 There is no need to dissect the other treaties cited by the majority on the maxim
falsus in unofalsus in omnibus. See Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 339 (1822)
(Story, J.).
234 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
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lose them by disuse.2 35  Finally, whatever the scope of presidential
practice to establish the meaning of amorphous grants to him, he
cannot go so far as to curtail by his practice express grants of
power to Congress. As said by Justice Frankfurter, even "[dieeply
imbedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot




The exclusion of the House from the disposition of the
Panama Canal constitutes a serious breach of constitutional bound-
aries in response to political pressures-fear that the treaty
would be blocked in the House. 23 8  It is the essence of constitu-
235 Cf. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950) (investigatory powers
of FTC not lost by disuse). In the Jay Treaty debates of 1796, Representative Havens "laid
it down as an incontrovertible maxim, that neither of the branches of the Government
could, rightfully or constitutionally, divest itself of any powers ... by a neglect to exercise
those powers that were granted to it by the Constitution." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 486 (1796).
23'6 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opin-
ion).
237 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (concurring opinion, Frankfurter,
J.).
238 Senator Orrin Hatch remarked: "I believe if you came to the House of Representa-
tives right now and asked the Members to approve legislation authorizing the giveaway of
the Panama Canal, you would not get a majority vote right now. That may be the reason
for the approach that is being taken by the administration." Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra
note 171, pt. 2, at 10. Logrolling and arm-twisting by the administration in the Senate was
reported in the press. See Canal Pact Support Still Short of Goal, N.Y. Times, March 15, 1978,
at A6, col. 1; Reston, The Voting Trade-Offs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1977, at A19, col. 1.
In an article written for the Virginia Law Weekly following a symposium on the Panama
Canal Treaty held at the University of Virginia, Professor John Norton Moore, moderator
of a panel on article IV, directed attention to the fact that
constitutional law and practice permits international agreements to be constitu-
tionally approved pursuant to Executive-Congressional agreement procedures
as well as the treaty power.... In this case the dispute concerning whether
such a procedure is constitutionally required at least adds further support to a
majority vote of both Houses as a constitutionally permissible modality.
Moore, supra note 11, at 4, col. 6 (emphasis added). During the same panel, his fellow
ex-State Department official, Professor Covey Oliver, "expressed his hope that in the future
more use would be made of 'Congressional-Executive Agreements' and less of treaties."
Symposium Considers Treaties: Speakers Weigh Pros, Cons, 30 Va. L. Weekly, Feb. 17, 1978, at
4, col. 1 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Symposium]. That concept was floated by
Professor Myres McDougal in 1944 to forestall a repetition of obstruction to world union
by a "wilful," "undemocratic" Senate minority-such as blocked our adherence to the
League of Nations under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge-by substituting approval
by a "majority" of both Houses. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
Agreements or Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54
YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945). Oliver prudently commended such agreements "in the future."
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tional government and of our constitutional system that no agent
of the people may overleap the bounds of delegated power nor
encroach on powers granted to another branch. Those boundaries
are not to be warped on pleas of political necessity.239 One re-
calls Justice Holmes' aphorism that "[g]reat cases like hard cases
make bad law," and arise because "some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest ... appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment." 
240
At best, the scope of the treaty power is ambiguous whereas
"Congress shall have power to dispose" is unequivocal. The bur-
den of proving that those plain terms mean something other than
they say, that is, that they must be read as "The President and
Senate shall have power to dispose," rests on proponents of that
reading, not the less because they would read those words into the
treatymaking power. 241  They have not sustained that burden; in
fact, the proof runs against them as is confirmed by the. fact that
the Supreme Court, in keeping with established canons of con-
struction, repeatedly has laid down as a principle that article IV
confers an exclusive power on Congress, a principle not vitiated by
the few loose dicta upon which the Edwards majority relies. It is
confirmed by Hamilton's recognition, in the midst of the Jay
Treaty struggle, that the disposition of property to which title is
not disputed by a foreign country is governed by article IV. It is
confirmed by the Senate's own constructions in 1816, 1844, and
1942.
Why not for the Panama Treaty? If a "majority" of both Houses is so admirable, on what
ground was one House altogether excluded in the teeth of article IV? The answer is that
the State Department veers with the political winds; it is the particular result that dictates
the choice. The State Department has circumvented the constitutional requirement of Sen-
ate consent to a treaty by casting international agreements in the form of executive
agreements, as if "the obligation to secure Senate approval is dissolved" by "calling an agree-
ment an executive agreement rather than a treaty." Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence,
1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 626. For discussion of the illegitimacy of executive agreements, see R.
BERGER, supra note 102, at 140-62. Now the State Department has made the Senate an
accomplice in circumventing the exercise by the House of its powers.
239 Chief Justice Marshall cautioned that "[t]he peculiar circumstances of the moment
may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional."
Letter from "A Friend of the Constitution" (J. Marshall) to Alexandria Gazette (July 5,
1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 184, 190-91 (G.
Gunther ed. 1969).
240 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
241 Moore argues the contrary: "The proponents of the 'exclusive' interpretation have a
large burden of persuasion as to why the treaty power is unavailable." Moore, supra note
11, at 4, col. 6. This is a bare assertion, unaccompanied by proof of any kind.
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Let it be assumed that established canons of construction have
no place on constitutional interpretation, 242 and that the Supreme
Court's reiterated holdings that the article IV power is "exclusive"
do not represent considered judgments. Nevertheless grave con-
siderations of policy urge that article IV be given "exclusive" ef-
fect. The grant of article IV echoes the "Congress shall have
power" of article I, section 8, which is followed by a lengthy string
of enumerated powers. As Madison pointed out, "[these powers,
however different in their nature or importance, are on the same
footing in the Constitution, and must share the same fate." 243
The reasoning of the Edwards majority in this respect is even
worse than the result, for, with the exception of the war power
(dubitante), the power to originate revenue bills, and the appro-
priation power, it invites the President by treaty to exercise all the
rest. That invitation collides with the basic considerations that un-
derlie the distribution of powers.
The House of Commons was the cradle of Anglo-American
liberties, and, like the English, the Founders put their trust in the
popularly-elected branch. 244  One need only recall their rejection
of Hamilton's proposal for a Senate modelled on the hereditary
House of Lords: "Nothing but a permanent [life-tenured] body
can check the imprudence of democracy." 245 They opted instead
for what Albert Gallatin described as "the sacred principle that
the people could not be bound without the consent of their im-
mediate Representatives," 2 46 the House of Representatives. To
them, for example, was given the exclusive power of originating
revenue bills. The Senate, James Iredell declared, was not au-
thorized "to prevent the house of representatives from protecting
the people." 247 And the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
acknowledged in 1844 with respect to a treaty regulating duties,
that
242 Judge MacKinnon notes that "[Tihe rules applicable to the construction of a statute
also apply to the construction of a Constitution. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th
Cir. 1937) .... Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D. Iowa 1964)." 580 F.2d at
1079 n.16 (dissenting opinion). So they were applied by the Founders from the beginning.
See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
242 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 490 (1796), quoted in text accompanying note 92 supra.
244 Justice Brandeis referred to the deep-seated conviction of the English and American
people that they "must look to representative assemblies for the protection of their liber-
ties." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
241 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 299. See id. at 288-89.
246 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1796), quoted in text accompanying note 100 supra.
247 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 145, quoted in text accompanying note 75 supra.
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the representatives of the people sitting in their legislative
capacity .. . may exercise this power more intelligently, more
discreetly ... and may better discern what true policy pre-
scribes and rejects, than is within the competence of the execu-
tive department of the Government.
2 48
Over the years the treatymaking power, whether it be with
respect to trademarks, patents, postal matters, or tariffs and the
like, has been exercised under congressional authorization. To
argue that the result of an "exclusive" reading of article IV would
be that the treatymaking power "would shrink to nothing," 249
overlooks that, despite those longtime practices, it has flourished
lustily; it overlooks that the President's own power is subject to
Senate "consent" and is no more "shrunk" thereby than is the
joint President-Senate power subject to the consent of Congress.
The Constitution, said Madison, "left with the PRESIDENT and
Senate the power of making Treaties, but required at the same
time the Legislative sanction and co-operation, in those cases
where the Constitution had given express and specific powers to
the Legislature. ' 25 0  For 175 years or more the President has
pretty consistently acted on that view and obtained consent of
Congress for acts that lie within the congressional province, and
the treaty power gives no sign that it has been "shrunk" thereby.
In fact, grasping for uncontrolled power, the President has dis-
placed the treaty power by resort to executive agreements which
evade even the consent of the Senate. 51
On the President's construction, adopted by the Edwards
majority, the treatymaking power, as Abraham Baldwin declared,
248 6 S. ExEc. J. 334 (1887), reprinted in 2 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 999, quoted in text accompanying note 107 supra.
249 Professor Stefan Riesenfeld insisted that "if Berger's analytic framework were correct
then the commerce clause would restrict the treaty making power also. Such a result would
mean that the treaty-making power 'would shrink to nothing."' Symposium, supra note 238,
at 3, col. 6, to 4, col. 1. Riesenfeld was in the employ of the State Department during
1977-1978, chiefly engaged on the article IV problem. One may prefer Madison to Riesen-
feld. Compare Justice Jackson's dismissal of "the Commander in Chief thesis as a 'loose
appellation' unjustifiably advanced as support for any presidential action, internal or ex-
ternal, involving the use of force, 'the idea being that it vests power to do anything, any-
where, that can be done with an army or navy."' A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 144 (1973) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
641-42 (1952) (concurring opinion)). Jackson added: "No penance would ever expiate the
sin against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive
powers by law through assuming his military role." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (concurring opinion).
250 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1796).
251 See R. BERGER, supra note 102, at 140-62.
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is "an indefinite, uncontrolled branch of the Government, the ex-
tent of whose powers was to be known only by its own acts." 
252
That construction is at war with the Framers' design to give the
President few and limited powers, 253 in Madison's words, "to fix
the extent of the Executive authority,"254 adding that the Execu-
tive power "shd. be confined and defined." 255  If we are to make
a choice between unlimited presidential power and a fear of
"shrinking" the treaty power, let us with Madison choose a con-
struction that "would preserve the mutual control between the
Senate and House of Representatives" 256 rather than further to
aggrandize a presidency that, as Justice Jackson said, is "already
so potent ... at the expense of Congress."
257
252 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 536 (1796), quoted in text accompanying note 97 supra.
253 See R. BERGER, supra note 102, at 49-59.
254 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 66.
255 Id. at 70. Another delegate to the Federal Convention, Charles Pinckney, reported to
South Carolina: "[W]e have defined his powers, and bound them to such limits as will
effectually prevent his usurping authorities dangerous to the general welfare . 4 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 314-15.
256 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 21, at 374, quoted in text accompanying note 103 supra.





Holden v. Joy 2 58 cited the following cases in support of the
proposition that a treaty may convey good title to land owned by
the United States without an act of Congress.259
A. "Reserve" Cases
1. United States v. Brooks 260
In 1835, the Caddo Indians ceded land to the United States
by treaty. A supplement to the treaty provided that Grappe's legal
representatives and his three sons "shall have their right to the
said four leagues of land reserved for them ... for ever." 2 6 The
Court held that the treaty, ratified by the Senate, "gave to the
Grappes a fee-simple title to all the rights which the Caddoes had
in these lands."262
2. Doe v. Wilson 2
6 3
The Pottawatomie Nation ceded land to the United States,
making reservations to individual Indians as part of the considera-
tion for the cession. "As to these, the Indian title remained as it
stood before the treaty was made; and to complete the title to the
reserved lands, the United States agreed that they would issue
patents to the respective owners." 264
3. Crews v. Burcham 
265
This was a cession by an Indian tribe with reserves. "The
main and controlling questions involved in this case were before
this court in the case of Doe et al. ,vs. Wilson ..., which arose
under a reservation in this treaty .... 266
258 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872), discussed in notes 140-53 and accompanying textsupra.
259 Id. at 247.
260 51 U.S. (10 How.) 442 (1850).
261 Id. at 451.
°212 Id. at 460.
263 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457 (1860).
264 Id. at 461-62.
265 66 U.S. (1 Black) 352 (1862).
266 Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
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4. Mitchell v. United States 267
Prior to the Spanish cession of Florida to the United States,
certain Indian tribes had made a cession to Spain, "reserving to
themselves full right and property" in specified lands.268 Examin-
ing the title to reserved land of a purchaser from the Indians, the
Court held that "by the treaty with Spain the United States ac-
quired no lands in Florida to which any person had lawfully ob-
tained such a right [of property]."269
5. The Kansas Indians
270
Under a treaty exchange of lands, certain Indian tribes re-
served lands for individual Indians.271 The issue, whether such
reserved, lands were taxable by Kansas, has no bearing on the dis-
position of property by the United States.
B. Irrelevant Cases
1. Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee 272
An Indian tribe made a cession to the United States, and, in
order to accommodate a United States garrison, provided that
"three other square miles are reserved for the particular disposal
of the United States on the north bank of the Tennessee, opposite
to and below the mouth of Highwassee." 273 The issue was
whether those three miles were to lay below or above the mouth
of the Highwassee. 27 4  The Court gave literal effect to the word
"below"; 275 no disposition of United States property was involved.
2. Wilson v. Wall
276
A treaty with the Choctaw Indians provided that heads of
certain Indian families would receive 640 acres each, with addi-
tional acres for each child. 277 The issue was whether an Indian
267 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
268 Id. at 749.
269 Id. at 733.
270 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
271 Id. at 739, 741.
272 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815).
273 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 18.
276 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83 (1867).
277 Id. at 84.
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held the land in trust for his children. One who purchased with-
out notice of the trust resisted the children's claim of constructive
trust. Congress had enacted a statute to clarify a part of the
treaty; the Court refused to give retroactive effect to the statute,
saying "Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights
under treaties except in cases purely political."27 8 The reason,
the Court explained, was that "[t]he construction of them is the
peculiar province of the judiciary." 27 9  In other words, interpre-
tation of treaties is for the courts.
3. American Insurance Co. v. Canter 280
Insurer brought a libel in the District Court of South
Carolina to obtain restitution of 356 bales of cotton carried by a
ship that was wrecked on the Florida Coast. A Florida territorial
court had earlier awarded seventy-six percent salvage to salvors,
who sold to Canter.2 81 The issue was whether the territorial
court had admiralty jurisdiction; no territorial grant by the United
States figures in the case.282
4. Worcester v. Georgia 283
Georgia convicted Worcester, a white missionary, of residing
within Indian territory without a state license. The Court held
that the Georgia statute was without force in Indian territory.284
The Indian treaty had placed them under the protection of the
United States,285 and gave the United States the sole right of
"managing all their affairs."286
5. Foster v. Neilson 287
'the case involved grants made in the ceded territory by
Spain prior to the treaty, which provided that "those grants shall
278 Id. at 89.
279 Id.
280 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
281 Id. at 541.
282 Id. at 545-46.
283 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
284 Id. at 561.
285 Id. at 551.
286 Id. at 553.
287 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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be ratified and confirmed." The Court held that "the ratification
and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legis-
lature,"2 88 i.e., Congress.
288 Id. at 315. Subsequently, Percheman v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), held
that no ratification was required because the Court discovered that the Spanish counterpart
version of the treaty dispensed with all ratification, a fact not known to the Foster Court (id.
at 89). This does not repudiate the Foster holding that if ratification is required, it falls to
Congress.
